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I. INTRODUCTION

On April 1st, 2008, Google announced the launch of "AdSense for
conversations," a contextual advertising program for everyday
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conversations.' As described by Google, "in just a few simple steps, you
can begin displaying ads that are relevant to the topics you're discussing
in an unobtrusive screen above your head."2 Thanks to Google's new
"Teleportation Technology," anyone can touch a link on the display and
"have the product appear instantaneously in [their] hands."3 This
development poses significant problems for trademark owners, as courts
have struggled to find a consistent and effective approach to protecting
trademark rights in triggered displays programs.4 This paper proposes a
new approach to handling trademark disputes in a manner that promotes
trademark law's normative goals of preventing deception and promoting
economic efficiency.
Of course, the Google announcement was an April Fool's Day joke.
But, the satire illustrates the very real problem for trademark law as
triggered displays increasingly permeate our lives. Triggered displays,
such as search engines and contextual advertising programs, are computer
programs that allow website operators to reach consumers in cyberspace. 5
These programs have spawned a multi-billon dollar advertising industry
online.6 They continue to evolve towards the utilization of video,7
consumer customization, and other cyberspaces like phone
communications. 9 As the technology evolves, so does the potential for
abuse.' ° The Internet provides fertile ground for capitalizing on the

1. Inside Adsense, http://adsense.blogspot.com/ (last visited July 30, 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See T.D.I. Intern., Inc. v. Golf Preservations, Inc., No. 6:07-313, 2008 WL 294531, *4
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 31, 2008) (discussing the "uncertain state of the law.").
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. Frank Rose, Microsoft's Bidfor Yahoo Is All About Big-Budget Brand Advertising,
WIREDMAG., Mar. 4,2008, http://www.wired.com/techbizlit/magazine/16-04/bzmicrosoft_yahoo
(there is currently a $8 billion industry for search engine advertising, and a $6.6 billion industry for
web display and video ads).
7. Inside Adsense, supra note 1.
8. Id. ("When a user clicks on the 'next' button, an entirely new group of ads will appear
in the ad unit, giving your users greater control over the ads they see and click.").
9. Google Mobile, http://www.google.com/intl/enus/mobile/sms/ (last visited July 30,
2008) (Text message Google for quick results.).
10. Internet Fraud: Hearing Before Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the Hearing Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 6-16 (2001)
(statement of Eileen Harrington, Associate Director of the Division of Marketing Practices of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) ("[T]he boom in ecommerce has
created fertile ground for fraud.").
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deception of consumers." As the law remains unsettled, 2 it is clear that
trademark law is not prepared to handle the problems that the new
technologies will present. As such, there is a need for a comprehensive
solution to protect consumers and trademark owners from the deceptive
use of trademark-triggered displays.
The first step to finding a solution is to get a clear understanding of the
economic impact of these programs on consumers, trademark owners and
the marketplace in general. Thus, Part II begins by discussing the
emergence of the electronic marketplace and the role of triggered displays.
It then proceeds to distinguish between beneficial and detrimental uses of
trademarks in these programs.
With this in mind, Part ELI analyzes the current approaches to handling
trademark-triggered display cases. In order to guide the analysis, Part Il
begins by setting out trademark law's normative goals of preventing
deception and promoting economic efficiency. It then analyzes the two
trademark doctrines that have dominated the litigation in this area: (1) the
initial interest confusion (C) doctrine; and (2) the trademark use doctrine.
The analysis concludes that neither doctrine has advanced trademark's
normative goals.
Part IV argues that this is because both doctrines make a final
infringement determination without an inquiry into the likelihood of
consumer confusion (LOCC). As such, to find a solution courts must
refocus the trademark infringement analysis on consumer confusion. First,
the trademark use doctrine must be disavowed because a confusion
analysis can better provide for a quick resolution of frivolous claims.
Second, the IC doctrine must be redefined to assure that liability rests
only on a finding of a LOCC. To do so effectively, Part V proposes a new
multi-factor test to measure LOCC in trademark-triggered display cases.
Finally, Part VI summarizes the proposed approach and argues that this
approach will allow courts to effectively prevent deception while
promoting economic efficiency. It will also provide clarity to handle
current and future technologies. Therefore, the courts should adopt the
comprehensive solution as the appropriate approach to handling
trademark-triggered display cases.

11. Id. ("Internet technology is the latest draw for opportunistic predators who specialize in
fraud.").
12. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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II. DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADEMARKTRIGGERED DISPLAYS ON THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE

A. Basic Principlesof the Internet, the Electronic Marketplaceand the
Role of TriggeredDisplays
By now, the underlying technology of the Internet has received
considerable treatment by commentators inside and outside of the legal
profession. 3 As such, this section focuses on the emergence of the
electronic marketplace and the role of triggered displays.
The Internet is not a single entity, but rather a collection of many
separate operators of computers and computer networks that utilize an
embodied switch network system for moving information traffic.' 4
Originally designed to link military and university networks, the Internet
is now "a decentralized, global medium of communications." 15 Of
particular importance for trademark law, the Internet has facilitated the
emergence of the computer-driven "electronic marketplace."' 6 The
marketplace can be defined as a "networked information system that
serves as an enabling infrastructure for buyers and sellers to exchange
information, transact, and perform other activities related to the
transaction."' 7
The emergence of the electronic marketplace has increased
competition" and the information available to consumers. 9 It is credited

13. See PATRICIA BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 13-20 (3d ed. 2007) (providing overview of Internet basics as well as lists

of various Internet sources); see also Thomas C. Folsom, Defining Cyberspace (Finding Real
Virtue in the Place of Virtual Reality), 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 78 n.5 (2007)("There
are readily accessible sources sufficient to explain what is happening in cyberspace... [b]ecause
the reader may now rely upon such sources there is no longer any need to burden an article... with
unnecessarily repetitious definitions and explanations").
14. See Am.Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also
Folsom, supra note 13, at 82.
15. Am. CivilLiberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
16. P. Rajan Varadarajan & Manjit S. Yadav, Marketing Strategy and the Internet: An
OrganizingFramework, 30 J.ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 296, 297 (2002).
17. Id.
18. FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ECONOMICS 23 (1995) ("'Competition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion: by
spreading information... [i]t
creates the views people have about what is best and cheapest."')
(citation omitted).
19. NivA ELKIN-KOREN & EL M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE: THE
EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 67 (2004).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[VIol. 13

with lowering consumer search costs and the informational asymmetry
between buyers and sellers.2" As information is potentially limitless on the
Internet,21 there is the potential for consumers to make perfectly informed
purchasing decisions.22 However, this also has the potential to create
"[d]ata smog," where the sheer volume of information is crippling to a
consumer's decisionmaking ability.23 In order to avoid "[d]ata smog,"
consumers must find effective methods of finding relevant information
online.24 To that end, consumers rely on technical means to assist them in
retrieving and selecting relevant information.25
In order to reach consumers, website owners began relying on triggered
displays to actively advertise their sites. 26 This created a multi-billion
dollar contextual advertising industry on the Internet.2 ' The industry relies
on targeting ads "at consumers who are actively interested in your type of
' The industry
product, rather than indiscriminately at the world-at-large."28
achieves this by using triggered displays to trigger ads based on consumer
acts of interest on the Web. For example, when consumers use search
engines, 29 they are exhibiting an interest in a particular search term. As
such, website owners began contracting with search engines for better
search result placement and design.30 Search engines also began selling
advertising space linked to keywords which appeared as "Sponsored
Information previously unavailable due to its non cost-effective distribution may
become obtainable in the online environment. The mechanisms of providing and
distributing information in Cyberspace are decentralized and allow every user to
become an information provider. Technically everyone can post information and
make it accessible to millions of users around the world at low cost.
Id.
20. Varadarajan & Yadav, supra note 16, at 296.
21. ELKiN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 19, at 67.
22. See generallyMaureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns
ProductandPricingInformation?, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1965, 1966 (2000) ("Certain characteristics
of electronic markets, however, enhance the possibility that e-commerce will be conducted in an
environment that comes closer to attaining the perfectly competitive ideal than that of most
conventional markets.").
23. ELUUN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 19, at 71.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Rose, supra note 6, at 2.
28. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 4, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881 (2d
Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
29. See AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. MEYER, GOOGLE'S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE

SCIENCE OF SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS (2006) (giving a thorough analysis of search engines).
30. ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 19, at 74-75.
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Links" next to organic search result listings. 3' Similarly, pop-up
advertising programs were created to display advertisements based on a
consumer's "in-the-moment" indicators of interest.32 Today, companies
can even purchase advertising space on e-mail programs that scan personal
e-mails for buzzwords.3 3
While these uses help provide consumers with relevant information,
they can also be used to deceive consumers. This is particularly true when
websites use the trademarks of their competitors. But not all uses of
trademarks are necessarily detrimental.34 In order to determine the
difference, the following subsections differentiate between some beneficial
and detrimental uses of trademarks in these programs.
B. Beneficial Uses of Trademarks in TriggeredDisplays
When functioning properly, triggered displays benefit the marketplace
by accurately and efficiently providing relevant information to consumers.
This allows consumers to make effective use of the information on the
Internet. The use of trademarks is beneficial to the marketplace when it
allows for the effective functioning of these programs. Such use is
particularly beneficial when it allows for increased competition and
accurate information dissemination. The three readily identifiable uses of
trademarks in triggered displays that achieve these purposes are (1)
relevant, (2) descriptive, and (3) comparative uses.
1. The Use of Trademarks for Their Relevance in the Trigger Function
Promotes Competition and Information Dissemination
In order for triggered displays to be effective, the trigger function must
be able to match consumers' indications of interest with relevant content.
Consumers can indicate interest in a product in a variety of ways. For
example, they may do so explicitly by performing a search for an item, or
implicitly by having an e-mail conversation about a particular interest.
These acts may also indicate an interest in a variety of derivative or related
31. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004).
32. 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WHENU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 2005).
33.

MICHAEL GORMAN, THE NExT MAJOR EMAIL DOMAIN: GMAIL.COM, DIGITAL IMPACT

(2004), at 4, http://www.digitalimpact.com/pdfs/Gmail. com_06.17.04.pdf ("Google scans email
content for terms it can link contextually to text ads displayed as 'sponsored links' to the right of
emails.").
34. That trademark use can be both beneficial and detrimental is illustrated by the fact that
plaintiffs often engaged in the same practices that they claimed to be infringing. See, e.g., 1-800Contacts,414 F.3d at 409 n.12("We think it noteworthy that prior to filing its lawsuit... [plaintiff]
entered into agreements... to have its own pop-up ad and banner ads delivered to C-users ....
").

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW & POLICY

[Vol. 13

products. Similarly, when consumers indicate an interest in a particular
trademark, there are a variety of interests that may be implicated. 35 As
consumers increasingly rely on trademarks in online commerce, 36 allowing
websites to use the expressed interest in the trademark to present relevant
information to consumers enhances competition and increases consumer
knowledge.
As an example, the Nike Corporation is known worldwide as one of the
largest sellers of athletic footwear and apparel. 37 Nike has also received
considerable attention for its international labor practices.38 So when a
consumer runs a search for Nike, relevant information may include
everything from the actual Nike website to information regarding the
company's labor practices. Competitors can provide information regarding
alternatives in product quality and price. Similarly, sites that sell Nike
products may give consumers options in pricing. Gripe sites can
disseminate information about corporate practices that consumers may
find contrary to their personal ethics. There are also a variety of other
websites on the Internet that offer reviews, commentary and analysis to
assist consumers in making purchasing decisions. 39 All of these sites
provide consumers with information to help them make better informed
purchasing decisions. Preventing these uses essentially removes
information from the marketplace.4 ° By allowing these uses, the increased
competition and information dissemination allows the electronic
marketplace to move towards perfect competition.4

35. See Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in InternetTrademarkLaw, 54 EMORY L.J.
507, 525 (2005) ("In the case of[']Canon,['] some consumers might use the term as a starting point
for a search for cameras, copiers, or printers.").
36. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 5 (1999).
37. Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., No. 205-cv-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, *1
(E.D. Ca. Sept. 18, 2007).
38. See generally JENNIFER BuRNS ET AL., HITTNG THE WALL: NIKE AND INTERNATIONAL
LABOR PRACTICES (2000).

39. See Varadarajan & Yadav, supra note 16, at 297-98.
40. EtKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 19, at 71 ("If you are not listed in the search
results, you are almost out of the web.").
41. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POuCY 196
(10th ed. 2006) ("A market is said to operate under perfect competition when the following four
conditions are satisfied: 1. Numerous small firms and customers.... 2. Homogenity ofproduct....
3. Freedom of entry and exit.... 4. Perfect information.").

A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR TRADEMARK-TRIGGERED DISPLAYS ONLINE

2. Descriptive and Comparative Uses of Trademarks in the Display
Function Allow for Efficient Dissemination of Information
While relevance helps make the trigger function effective, descriptive
and referential uses of trademarks allow companies to effectively use the
display. Once the display is presented to the consumer, it must provide
accurate information to allow the consumer to make an informed
decision. Trademarks create market efficiencies by allowing consumers
to identify products and companies by one name.43 Economic efficiency
dictates that website owners should be able to use the most effective
language available to convey their message to consumers. Descriptive and
referential uses of a trademark allow website operators to accurately and
efficiently relay information regarding their own product to the consumer.
Limiting the language that they may use creates inefficiencies that harm
all the players in the market.
An example from the world of politics best illustrates this danger.
Recently, Susan Collins, a Republican senator from Maine, used the
MoveOn.org trademark in paid search result listings." As opposition to
MoveOn.org is a very powerful fundraising tool for Republicans, Collins
used the mark in the ads to convey to constituents that she was
fundamentally opposed to the group's views.45 The listings contained
content such as, "Susan Collins is MoveOn's primary target. Learn how
' In the limited space of search result listings, using the
you can help."46
trademark allowed Collins to effectively and efficiently convey her
political views to constituents. Nevertheless, Google removed the ads
following complaints from Moveon.org.47 After receiving a "barrage of

criticism," MoveOn.org removed its complaints and admitted that its
actions impeded the truthful dissemination of information.48 The actions
of MoveOn.org and Google essentially removed information from the

42. See Goldman,supra note 35, at 516-19 (giving an in-depth analysis of evaluation process
for search results).
43. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1987).
44. See Sarah Lai Stirland, Moveon.org Backs Down From Asserting its Trademark on
GoogleAdNetwork, WIRED, Oct. 15,2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/l0/moveonorgbacks.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
45. JON HEALEY, POSTING OF JON HEALEY To Los ANGELES TIMES: OPINION L.A., (Oct. 11,
2007), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionIa/2007/10/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
46. Robert Cox, Commentary, GoogleBansAnti-MoveOn.orgAds,EXAMINER.COM, Oct. 11,
2007, http://www.examiner.com/a-983 100-Google bans anti MoveOn orgads.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2008).
47. Id.
48. Stirland, supra note 44.
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World Wide Web even though "use of a similar name by another to
truthfully describe his own product does not constitute a legal or moral
wrong." 49 Instead, allowing descriptive uses creates efficiencies in the
marketplace without any detriment to the trademark owner.
Similarly, the use of comparative distinctions serves the "public
interest" by effectively providing consumers with relevant information."
Comparative use can be summed up with the slogan, "If You Like
Plaintiff, You'll Love Defendant."'" The use of a trademark in making
comparative distinctions "is beneficial to consumers" as "[t]hey learn at
a glance what kind of product is for sale and how it differs from a known
benchmark."52 This is often the most effective and efficient method of
communicating information to the consumer. Like descriptive uses,
comparative uses enhance the values of the electronic marketplace by
truthfully and accurately providing information and increasing
competition. However, as discussed below, both descriptive and
comparative uses can become detrimental if they actually deceive
consumers as to the source of the website.
C. DetrimentalUses of Trademarksin TriggeredDisplays
Consumers rely on triggered displays to assist them in retrieving and
selecting relevant information. They also "have come to rely heavily on
familiar brand names when engaging in online commerce. 53 As such, the
use of trademarks to confuse or deceive consumers in triggered displays
can be particularly damaging to the electronic marketplace; specifically,
it harms trademark owners by lessening the trademark's informational
value and connection with consumers. This deception also harms
consumer confidence in trademarks, triggered displays, and the electronic
marketplace in general. Finally, as Congress has recognized with other
technologies online, deception greatly impairs the proper functioning of
the electronic marketplace.
Deception harms trademark owners by allowing competitors to freeride off the goodwill of the trademark. Goodwill can be described as the
ability "to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,

49.
50.
51.
Cir. Feb.
52.
53.

William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 529 (1924).
Oral-B Lab., Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1987).
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 21, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881 (2d
12 2007).
August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 5.
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the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears."54 Free-riding
allows competitors to trade on that goodwill by grabbing the consumers
attention through deception. 5 "If the law does not prevent it, free[-]riding
will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark."56
While beneficial uses also divert consumer attention from the trademark
owner, they benefit consumers by providing accurate and relevant
information.
Conversely, free-riding harms trademark owners and consumers. 7
When deception is effective, "the deceived.., becomes the unwilling tool,
serving another man's ends without advancing his own." 8 This produces
suspicion and second-guessing regarding the deceptive action. 9 So when
consumers are deceived by one of these programs, they lose confidence in
the underlying technology. This loss of confidence can negate the benefits
that triggered displays create in allowing consumers to allocate their
attention efficiently among the world of information online. 0 Similarly,
when a trademark causes the deception, the result "is the erosion of
consumer confidence in brand name identifiers and in electronic
commerce generally."'
Congress has on numerous occasions recognized the harm that this
causes to the proper functioning of the electronic marketplace. In 2000,
Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act62 as a "preventive measure against deceptive and
The Act facilitates efraudulent practices in the electronic marketplace. "6'
commerce by discouraging deception and fraud in electronic
transactions.' Similarly, Congress enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting

54.
1942).
55.
56.
57.

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (U.S.
Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 272.
Id.
See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co., 316 U.S. at 205.

58. STEFAN GRUNDMANN ET AL., PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE

INTERNAL MARKET 65 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2001).
59. See generally Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Economists' and Psycologists'
Experimental Practices:How Do They Differ, Why They Differ, andHow They Can Converge, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 261 (Isabelle Brocas &
Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003).

60. See generally ELKN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 19, at 71.
61. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 5.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000).
63. FTC.gov, Joint FTC/Commerce Department Report Released on "Reasonable
Demonstration" Requirement of ESIGN, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/06/esign.shtm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2008).

64. Id. at 7.
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Consumer Protection Act65 to prevent cybersquatting, "which refers to the
deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain names in
violation of the rights of trademark owners." Noting that the "practice of
cybersquatting harms consumers [and] electronic commerce," Congress's
purpose was "to protect consumers and American businesses," as well as
to promote the growth of online commerce."67
It is clear that deception harms consumers, trademark owners, and the
electronic marketplace in general. With this in mind, the following section
examines whether the current approaches to handling triggered display
cases have succeeded in preventing deception and allowing beneficial
uses.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO HANDLING
TRADEMARK-TRIGGERED DISPLAY CASES

A. The Normative Goals of TrademarkLaw
As trademark law is grounded in unfair competition law, it must
constantly adapt to new forms of competition in the changing marketplace.
As far back as 1925, Frank Schechter described the difficulty of
reconciling then-established principles of trademark law to the new
"complicated channels of modem distribution."6' Over eighty years later,
trademark law is still struggling to adapt to the ever changing nature of the
market because "new problems are arising more rapidly than courts and
legislatures can address them."6 9 But, as technology progresses, it "will
embody and build upon the experiences of the past."7 Thus, when
examining new technologies, it is important to keep in mind the traditional
normative goals of trademark law.
The first identifiable normative goal of trademark law is to prevent
deception in the marketplace. The core principle of unfair competition law
"is that 'a man is not to sell his own goods under the pretense that they are

65.
66.
67.
68.

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
S.Rep. No. 106-140, at 5.
Id. at 4.
FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 147 (1925).
69. PETER B. MAGGs & ROGER E. SCHECTER, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
543 (6th ed. 2002).
70. Varadarajan & Yadav, supra note 16, at 298.
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the goods of another man."'' 7' Trademark law grew as a subset of that
principle72 to protect marks that were "used to distinguish a good or
service produced by one firm from the goods or services of [a
competitor] .,7 A trademark owner was granted the "right to prohibit the
use of [the mark] so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale
of another's product as his."74 Protection was, and is still, measured on a
LOCC standard, "i.e., whether the similarity of the marks [was] likely to
confuse customers about the source of the products."75 Although the
emphasis was on protecting the tradesman,76 this also resulted in protection
for consumers.77
Beyond this traditional formulation, modem commentators argue that
trademark law also has a normative goal to promote economic efficiency.78
Lemley argues that trademark law "both draws from and reinforces the
notion that competitive markets, under ordinary circumstances, will ensure
efficient resource allocation and bring consumers the highest quality
products at the lowest prices. 79 Indeed, Landes and Posner illustrated in
their landmark article that trademark law promotes market efficiencies by
lowering consumer search costs and providing an incentive to invest in
product quality.8" Even if this was not the original intent, it has since been
adopted as a cognizable rationale for trademark protection. As such, it can

SCHECHTER, supra note 68, at 146.
72. See Mark P. McKenna, The NormativeFoundationsof TrademarkLaw,82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1839, 1861 (2007)("From the very beginning, trademark cases... were grounded in the
same fundamental principle .... ").
73. Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 270.
74. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
75. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446,
1454 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Determining who courts originally sought to protect has been the subject of great debate.
Compare, e.g., McKenna, supra note 72, at 1841-42 (providing historical analysis to show that
courts were concerned with protecting business owners only), with Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1694-95 (1999) (arguing that
courts were traditionally interested in protecting consumers).
77. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION §
2:1 (4th ed. 2007); see also Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 11 PENN. ST. L. REV.
823,825 (2007) ("Trademark law was thus intended to protect the goodwill of the tradesperson and,
in turn, protect the consumer from being deceived.").
78. Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 267.
79. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1227 (2007).
80. Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 270-79.
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be argued that trademark law has "pro-information" and "pro-competition"
goals in the marketplace."
As courts deal with new problems in the marketplace,82 it is important
to keep both normative goals in mind. Rules that do not prevent deception
or promote economic efficiency should be thought of as contrary to
trademark principles. In the context of triggered displays, this means that
the law should prevent the deceptive uses while allowing the beneficial
uses to continue.8 ' The following subsections analyze whether the current
legal approaches to triggered displays promote these normative goals.
B. Analysis of the InitialInterest Confusion Doctrine as Applied to
TriggeredDisplay Cases
Any analysis of triggered display cases must begin with the IIC
doctrine, as it has become the most accepted doctrine in this area. 84 The nC
doctrine deals with cases where consumers are initially confused as to the
source of a product, but that confusion subsides by the time of any
purchase. 85 The alleged harm is that competitors will attract consumers'
interest by creating confusion regarding the source of the products.86
Courts have held that this practice "affect[s] the buying decisions of
consumers in the market for the goods, effectively allowing the competitor
to get its foot in the door by confusing consumers., 87 "This confusion, or
mistaken beliefs as to the companies' interrelationships, can destroy the
88
value of the trademark which is intended to point to only one company.

81. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 79, at 1227.
82. See generallyMcKenna, supra note 72, at 1896-1915 (examination of the extension of
trademark law to new fact patterns).
83. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
84. MAGGS & SCHECTER, supra note 69, at 600.

85. See, e.g., Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) ("The issue
here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually
a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway,
rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the "[']Grotrian-Steinweg[']" name and thinking
it had some connection with "[']Steinway,[']" would consider it on that basis.").
86. See id. at 1341 ("Misled into an initial interest, a potential Steinway buyer may satisfy
himself that the less expensive Grotrian-Steinweg is at least as good, if not better, than a
Steinway.")
87. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. Grotrian,523 F.2d at 1341.
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1. The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Has Been Misapplied in
Triggered Display Cases
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit adopted the IIC doctrine as the appropriate
means to measure infringement in triggered display cases. 9 In Brookfield,
the defendant used the plaintiff's trademark in metatags for its own
website. 9° The circuit court found that the defendant created IIC "by using
[']moviebuff.com['] or [']MovieBuff['] to divert people looking for
[']MovieBuffl'] to its web site."'" In discussing the applicability of the
doctrine, the court stated this now famous analogy of metatags to
billboards:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts
up a billboard on a highway reading- "West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West
Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble
to continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster
right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they
are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they
have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any
way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is
only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired
goodwill.92
Courts and commentators have questioned the appropriateness of the
analogy.93 One problem is that the court made its findings without a
significant inquiry into the underlying technology or its effect on
consumers.94 As such, unlike pulling off on the wrong highway exit, the

89. Brookfield Commc'n v. W. Coast Entn't Co., 174 F.3d 1036 (1999).
90. Id. at 1062.
91. Id.

92. Id. at 1064.
93. See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Conimc'n Co., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-35 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring); See also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemnley, Trademarksand
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 816 (2007).
94. See Jacob Jacoby & Mark Sableman, Keyword-Based Advertising: Filling in Factual
Voids (GEICO v. Google), 97 TRADEMARK REP. 681,693 (2007) ("In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit
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analogy severely underestimates an Internet users ability to remedy the
mistake in seconds.9" Also, search results contain a link and normally
present both options. So the harm is less like a deceptive billboard, and
more like a deceptive store front.
However, the major problem with the Brookfield court's ruling is that
it did not inquire into whether consumers were likely to be confused by the
search results. Even if the analogy is accurate, there was no determination
as to whether consumers were likely to be confused into visiting the
defendant's site. This has led other courts to similarly find IIC without a
proper LOCC analysis.96 These courts ignore that trademark infringement
is based on an inquiry of the likelihood of confusion of the "ordinarily
prudent purchaser."97 Without such an inquiry, it "expands the reach of
[11C] from situations in which a party is initially confused to situations in
which a party is never confused."98 This expands the owner's trademark
rights to prevent all uses of a trademark as a trigger, even if they take every
precaution to assure that there is no confusion.99 As such, the Brookfield
approach to HC does not promote any interests of trademark law as it does
not prevent deception.' 00
2. Current Multi-Factor Likelihood of Confusion Tests Insufficiently
Measure Consumer Confusion in Triggered Display Cases
Some subsequent cases applying the HC doctrine to triggered displays
have acknowledged these problems and applied a LOCC analysis.'
However, this does not solve the problem entirely, as the traditional multi-

explicitly made findings about search engine practices and consumer confusion on a sparse
preliminary injunction record that was, at best, based on a few affidavits from the parties.").
95. See generally Goldman, supra note 35, at 520 ("The searcher need only hit the back
button, type a new web address into the address bar, or select a new bookmark. Any of these steps
requires just a moment or two of the searcher's time.").
96. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., No. 07-11574, 2008 WL 918411, at
*5 (1 lth Cir. Apr. 7, 2008) ("[The district court] made an explicit finding only with respect to the
ultimate conclusion that there was a likelihood of confusion.").
97. See, e.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickemick Co., 96 F.2d 978, 987 (8th Cir. 1938)
("The test of whether a trademark is infringed has been several times stated by this Court to be
whether 'an ordinarily prudent purchaser be liable to purchase the one believing purchasing the
other.") (citing Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. H. P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1931)).
98. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Co., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Berzon, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. See generally id.
101. Id. at 1026-30.

A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR TRADEMARK-TRIGGERED DISPLA YS ONLINE

factor LOCC tests do not apply well in the Internet context. 1 2 The Ninth
Circuit attempted to remedy this by creating an "Internet trinity" of what
it considers the three most important LOCC factors: "(1) the similarity of
the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the parties'
simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel."' 0 3 In application,
where these factors "weigh against the defendant, a finding of likelihood
of confusion is proper unless the defendant shows the remaining Sleekcraft
factors [']weigh strongly against a likelihood of confusion.[']" 1" While an
improvement on the Brookfield analysis, these factors still inadequately
address consumer confusion.
For example, the first factor (measuring the similarity of the marks) is
merely a threshold question to determine whether the marks are similar
enough to merit a finding of confusion. °5 The second factor (the
relatedness of the goods or services) is irrelevant to triggered displays
because consumers do not interact with the goods at the display stage.
Finally, it (the parties' simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel) is often redundant of the second factor."° The final factor is also
irrelevant to the analysis because the defendant will necessarily be using
the web. This makes the shifting nature of the Ninth Circuit approach
particularly troublesome.107 It creates a presumption of confusion without
a sufficient inquiry into whether consumers are likely to be confused. The
onus is then on the defendant to prove a negative, that there is an absence
of confusion. Like the Brookfield approach, this is contrary to traditional
principles of trademark law because it creates the possibility of
infringement where there is no consumer confusion.

102. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Co., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24
(9th Cir. 1999) ("Because... the traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the
metatags issue, we do not attempt to fit our discussion into one of the Sleekcraft factors."); see also
Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1998) ("This case.., does not
lend itself to the systematic application of the eight factors.").
103. Interstellar Starship Serv., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002).
104. Storus Co. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454, 2008 WL 449835, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
15, 2008) (quoting Perfumebay.com v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
105. See, e.g., Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189(5th
Cir. 1981) ("The two marks must bear some threshold resemblance in order to trigger inquiry into
extrinsic factors.. ")).
106. Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of the MultifactorTestsfor TrademarkInfringement,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1643 (2006) ("The factors relating to the similarity of the parties'
advertising, marketing, and sales facilities all tended to be redundant of the proximity of the goods
factor .... ).
107. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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3. The Application of the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine in
Triggered Display Cases has Hindered Economic Efficiency
The application of the HC doctrine to triggered display cases also runs
counter to the economic goals of trademark law. Whether applying the
Brookfield decision or the faulty multi-factor tests, IIC has created
overprotection by allowing trademark owners to prohibit non-confusing,
beneficial uses of their mark. This essentially removes information from
the Internet by damaging the ability of consumers to retrieve relevant
information."" It would allow MoveOn.org to prevent Susan Collins from
effectively providing her constituents with information about her views on
the organization.'0 9 Similarly, it would allow Nike to prevent gripe sites
from using its trademark to inform consumers about its corporate
practices.11 ° This not only harms consumer's ability to find relevant
information, it also eliminates avenues of fair competition. The result is an
inefficient market with increased search costs and prices. As such, the
application of the HC doctrine to triggered display cases is inconsistent
with both of trademark law's normative goals. As discussed next, perhaps
this overprotection is why the trademark use doctrine has gained some
traction in triggered display cases.
C. Analysis of the Trademark Use Doctrine as Applied to Triggered
Display Cases
Indeed, proponents of the Trademark Use theory argue that "it prevents
efforts .. . to use trademark law as a tool to disrupt legitimate
competition. . . ."" The fundamental premise of the theory is that the
Lanham Act requires a threshold inquiry into whether there has been a
"trademark use" before there can be any inquiry into confusion. 112 As such,
only unauthorized uses of a trademark "as a mark" should qualify for
trademark infringement." 3 The proposed goal of such a preliminary
inquiry is to provide clarity and a quick resolution to "trademark claim[s]

108. See supra text accompanying note 40.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
110. See supra Part II.B. 1.
111. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 9, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881 (2d
Cir. Feb. 12 2007).
112. See, e.g., 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WHENU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,412 (2d Cir. 2005)
("Not onlyare [']use,['] [']in commerce,['] and [']likelihood of confusion['] three distinct elements
of a trademark infringement claim, but [']use['] must be decided as a threshold matter .... ).
113. Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, andthe Structure of TrademarkLaw, 33 HOFSTRAL. REv.
603, 608 (2004) ("[Tlhe primary predicate of trademark law.., is that a term or symbol be used
by the party as a mark .... ) (emphasis added).
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against parties that
do not promote their own products or services under the
'"1 4
mark."
protected
The theory finds support in the multiple uses of the word "use" in the
Lanham Act. The infringement provision of the Lanham Act for registered
marks, § 32(1)(a), states that infringement occurs whenever a user "use[s]
in commerce... a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services... which.., is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.", 5 The
infringement provision for unregistered marks contains the same language
with regards to "uses in commerce.""' 6 In 1988, Congress added a
definition of "use in commerce" in § 45, defining it as "the bona fide use
of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve
a right in a mark.""..7 The definition also requires that to use the mark, the
mark must be "placed in any manner on the goods or their containers...
118
," or for services, "used or displayed in the sale or advertising ...
Courts applying the use theory have used the definition to find that the use
of a trademark in a triggered display does not qualify because the
defendants do not place the trademark on any goods." 9
1. The Good: The Trademark Use Theory has Allowed for the Quick
Dismissal of Frivolous Claims
The most prominent use of the trademark use theory has been in the
Second Circuit. 2 ° The seminal case is 1-800-Contacts, where the
defendant provided consumers with a downloadable program that triggered
pop-up advertisements based on users' "in-the-moment" activities."'2 The
programs operated by utilizing an internal directory comprising of various

114. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding TrademarkLaw Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOwA L. REv. 1669, 1673 (2007).
115. 15U.S.C.§ 1114(2006).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he use of trademarks in keywords and metags constitutes Lanham Act
[']use['] where... defendant does not place the trademark on any product, good or service.
Site Pro-i, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The key
question is whether the defendant placed plaintiffs trademark on any goods, displays, containers,
or advertisements .... ).
120. See generallyFragrencenet.com,493 F. Supp. 2d at 547 ("[T]hough most courts in other
circuits allow a trademark infringement claim based on such use, district courts in this Circuit have
not allowed these... claims to go forward.").
121. 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WHENU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 2005).
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websites and search terms that would trigger the pop-ups. 22
' The mark was
used solely in the internal directory as a trigger and it did not appear on the
display.'
The 1-800-Contacts court found that such a use was a
"company's internal utilization" of a mark which is "analogous to a
individual's private thoughts about a trademark."' 24 Accordingly, such a
use did not violate the Lanham Act.'25
This precedent has been helpful in allowing for the quick dismissal of
cases where the mark is used solely as an internal trigger and there is
clearly no chance of consumer confusion. For example, in Rescuecom
Corp. v. Google, Inc., the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
when the plaintiff did not establish that its trademark appeared on any of
the defendant's search results.'2 6 In such a case, the defendant uses the
mark solely in the trigger and solely for its relevance. There is little chance
that the consumer can be confused because the consumer has no visual
interaction with the trademark.'27 So Rescuecom reaches the right
economic result because there is a beneficial use without any risk of
confusion.
2. The Bad: The Trademark Use Theory has Created a Dangerous
Precedent for Allowing Deceptive Practices to Continue to the
Detriment of Trademark's Normative Goals
Nevertheless, there is language in 1-800-Contacts that has created a
more dangerous precedent for trademark law. The circuit court stated that
"while any number of activities may... create a likelihood of confusion,
no such activity is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the [']use['] of
a trademark.' ' 2' This statement is entirely contradictory to the normative
goal of preventing deception. It creates the possibility that companies
profiting off another's trademark by creating confusion can escape liability
if their activities are classified as not a "trademark use." In fact, the
Rescuecom court expanded on this rule by stating that "[e]ven if plaintiff

122. Id.
123. Id. at 409.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
127. See, e.g., 1-800-Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409 ("[T]he appearance of 1-800's Con
website address in the directory does not create a possibility of visual confusion with 1-800's
mark."); J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115,
at *8 (E.D. Penn. Jan. 4,2007) ("[P]otential consumers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's
services, goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of plaintiff.").
128. 1-800-Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 412.
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proved.., that Internet users viewing the competitors' sponsored links are
confused as to whether the sponsored links belong to or emanate from
' This is
plaintiff," these facts do not "establish trademark use."129
especially
troubling because such evidence is the traditional standard on which
trademark infringement is measured.13
The application of the use doctrine in S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian
Gold,Inc. 31 best illustrates the danger this causes. The S&L Vitamins court
found that the use requirement was not met despite the defendant's
placement of the mark in its search result listings.' The court, relying on
a finding in another keyword purchase case, Merck & Co. v. Mediplan
Health Consulting,Inc.,133 found that there was no trademark use because
the defendant sold the trademarked product. 34 This is a manifestation of
the dangerous language in 1-800-Contacts. First, the Merck decision is
contrary to trademark principles, which allow dealers to use the trademark
in advertisements as long as there is no confusion. 135 But more importantly,
under this precedent, confusing uses are now allowable as long as the user
actually sells the trademarked product.
This has the potential to create numerous problems in the electronic
marketplace. Search result listings could consist of nothing more than
identical links claiming to be the trademark owner. In creating its triggered
displays, secondary market websites, like eBay, can make themselves out
to be any company which has a product sold on their website. Faced with
these deceptive and unhelpful displays, consumers would lose confidence

129. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01.
130. See Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350,355 (6th Cir.
1998) ("[T]he touchstone of liability.., is whether the defendant's use of the disputed mark is
likely to cause confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the
parties.") (citing Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr., Inc., 109 F.
3d 273, 280 (6th Cir. 1997)).
131. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201-02 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
132. Id. at 201 ("Much more than that, however, the Marks also appear in the description of
the result ... ").
133. Id. at 201-02 ("Moreover, it is significant that defendants actually sell Zocor... on their
websites.") (quoting Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402,41516 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
134. S&L Vitamins, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d at 201 ("[Defendant] actually sells the trademarked
Products .... In such a situation, there is nothing improper with [S&L's] purchase of sponsored
links .... ).
135. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477,484 (5th Cir. 2004)
("Independent dealers and repair shops may use a mark to advertise truthfully that they sell or
repair certain branded products so long as the advertisement does not suggest affiliation with or
endorsement by the markholder.").
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in the programs."' With the programs losing their effectiveness, there is
a likelihood that it would increase search costs and possibly lead to the
"[d]ata smog" effect. 137 So although the use doctrine can sometimes be
rationalized on economic grounds, 138 it can also harm consumers,
trademark owners, and the marketplace in general. With this in mind it is
no wonder that there has been significant commentary questioning the
efficacy of either doctrine in dealing with triggered displays. The following
section proposes a solution.
IV. SOLUTION: REFOCUS THE INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS ON THE
LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER CONFUSION

After ten years of triggered display cases, it is clear that neither doctrine
furthers the normative goals of trademark law. The problem with both
doctrines is that they reach an ultimate determination without an analysis
of consumer confusion. The result is that they provide favorable
resolutions for some parties, but they are unhelpful in preventing deception
and promoting economic efficiency. As such, this section argues that the
appropriate solution is to refocus the infringement analysis in consumer
confusion. To accomplish this, courts must first disavow the trademark use
doctrine as unnecessary and inconsistent with the Lanham Act. Then courts
must ground the IIC doctrine with an appropriate LOCC analysis to
adequately protect consumers and trademark owners.
A. The Use Doctrine is Unnecessaryand Inconsistentwith the
Lanham Act
1. A Confusion Analysis is Better Suited to Provide a Quick Dismissal
of Frivolous Claims
The primary problem with the trademark use doctrine is that a
confusion analysis is perfectly capable of performing the same limiting
function that it is designed to perform. Google argued on appeal in the
Second Circuit that "[t]he trademark use doctrine ...exist[s] to filter out
a category of claims where consumer confusion is unlikely.' ' 139 This is

136.
137.
138.
139.
Cir. Feb.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 114, at 1688.
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 21, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881 (2d
12 2007).
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unnecessary because confusion already exists as the limiting function of
trademark law. 4 In fact, there is already precedent establishing that a
confusion analysis can provide for a quick resolution in triggered display
cases. 41 For example, inJ. G. Wenworth, the defendant purchased space on
the search results for plaintiffs mark through Google's AdWords
program. 142 The defendant did not, however, place the plaintiff's mark on
any of its search result listings. 43 As a result, the court found that
"potential consumers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's services,
goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of plaintiff."'" Thus, the
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because "no reasonable
fact finder could find a likelihood of confusion under [these] set of
facts."' 45
Any of the Second Circuit cases that utilized the use theory for a quick
resolution could have just as easily applied a confusion analysis similar to
that in J. G. Wentworth to reach the same result. For example, the 1-800Contacts court acknowledged that there was no possibility of confusion
under the facts of the case."4 The circuit court stated that "the appearance
of 1-800-Contact's web site address in the directory does not create a
possibility of visual confusion with 1-800's mark. ' 147 The circuit court
could have ruled that this meant that "no reasonable fact finder could find
a likelihood of confusion on [these] set of facts."' 48 The district court cases
following the 1-800-Contacts case would have reached the same result
under this precedent. Those courts based their decisions to dismiss the
claims on whether the defendants placed the trademarks on the display.'49

140. Doellinger, supranote 77, at 850 ("In fact, trademark law already has a built-in filter, the
confusion requirement.").
141. J.G. Wentworth Ltd. v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *8
(E.D. Penn. Jan. 4, 2007) (granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of possibility of
confusion).
142. Id. at *7.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *8.
145. Id.
146. 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WHENU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005).
147. Id.
148. See J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115 at *8 (quoting Quest Commc'n Int'l v. CyberQuest, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 (M.D. Pa. 2000)).
149. See, e.g., Site Pro-l, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) ("The key question is whether defendant placed plaintiff's trademark on any goods, displays,
containers, or advertisements.... ."); Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp.
2d 545, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he use of trademarks in keywords and metags constitutes
Lanham Act [']use['] where ... defendant does not place the trademark on any product, good or
service .... ).
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This is the same inquiry that occurred in the J.G. Wentworth case.
Furthermore, it would have caused the S&L Vitamins court to deny the
motion to dismiss because the plaintiff established that the mark did appear
on the display. 50 As such, a confusion analysis performs the same limiting
function without the detrimental effects.
2. The Trademark Use Doctrine is Inconsistent With the Lanham Act
and Can Only be Reconciled in Relation to Confusion
This is not surprising, as the trademark use doctrine can only be
reconciled by relation to confusion. 5 ' As stated by Professor McKenna,
"because trademark use is not separable from consumer understanding,
proponents cannot articulate the doctrine without lapsing into claims about
likelihood of confusion."' 52 For example, Google's definition above
justifies the use doctrine in relation to confusion.' 53 Similarly, proponents
attempt to define "trademark use" as use that "promote[s] its own products
or services" and "indicate[s] the source or sponsorship of those products
or services."' 54 However, in order to determine whether a mark indicates
source or sponsorship, there would need to be an inquiry into consumer
understanding.' 55 Consumer confusion analysis has always been aimed at
determining that very question.
Similarly, arguments that the definition of "use in commerce" in § 45
of the Lanham Act should be applied to infringement decisions also lapse
into questions of confusion. Proponents of the use theory admit that the
language of § 45 is at odds with the language in the infringement
provisions.'56 The definition in § 45 would limit liability to cases where the
mark is used on the actual product, while the infringement provisions
clearly allow for liability to exist when the mark is used in
advertisements. 57
' Proponents argue, however, that statutory interpretation
mandates that the differences be reconciled to mean that infringement

150. See S&L Vitamins, Inc., v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) ("Much more than that, however, the Marks also appear in the description of the
result....").
151. See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source in TrademarkLaw,
at 4, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at: http://ssm.com/abstra ct=1088479 (last
visited Oct. 15, 2008).
152. Id. at 5.
153. See supra text accompanying note 139.
154. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 114, at 1682.
155. See McKenna, supra note 151, at 5.
156. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 114, at 1675-76.
157. See id. at 1676.
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liability should be imposed "only on those who created confusion in the
process of selling, marketing, or advertising their own products."'5 8 This
reconciled definition is far from the rigid application that courts have used
when utilizing § 45.159 But more importantly, if you remove confusion
from this formulation, all that is left is that the defendant sell, market, or
advertise its product. As a practical matter, website operators use triggered
displays to draw consumer traffic to their website. It is safe to assume that
most are doing so to further their own business interests. As such, all that
is left of the formulation is a determination of confusion.
This explains why the use theory reaches a favorable result when there
is little chance of confusion, but reaches an unfavorable result when
confusion is possible. As a confusion analysis is perfectly capable of
providing a quick resolution to frivolous claims, courts should disavow the
use theory from any triggered display analysis.
B. InitialInterest Confusion is the AppropriateDoctrine to Address
Trademark-TriggeredDisplay Cases ifit is Groundedin a Likelihood of
Confusion Analysis
While the use theory must be disavowed, the HC doctrine can be
salvaged as the appropriate doctrine for triggered display cases. This is
because the doctrine is consistent with trademark principles and it
addresses the type of harm associated with detrimental uses in triggered
displays. The HC doctrine as originally conceived was not a new doctrine,
but rather a "simple recognition that competition-distorting confusion can
occur at times other than the point of sale."' 60 The doctrine is a logical
extension oftraditional unfair competition principles. To reiterate, the core
principle of unfair competition law "is that a man is not to sell his own
goods under the pretense that they are the goods of another man."'' The
HC doctrine addresses situations where a man creates interest in his own
goods under the pretense that they are the goods of another man. 162 The
sole difference is that there is a disconnect between the confusion and the
point of sale. Nevertheless, the harm is the same because the competitor
has unduly profited by creating confusion.
An example best illustrates this point. In Niton Corp. v. Radiation
MonitoringDevices, Inc., the defendant copied the plaintiff's metatags in
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying note 119.
160. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 93, at 814.
161. SCHECHTER, supra note 68, at 146.
162. See generallyGrotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); see also
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
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order to create identical search results. 6 3 When a consumer searched for
the plaintiffs trademark, several links appeared claiming to be the
plaintiff's website.6" Despite the appearance, several of the links actually
belonged to the defendant.' 65 As such, whether consumers reached the
plaintiff's site was a matter of chance. When a consumer clicked on the
defendant's link, it amounted to "the distraction or diversion of a potential
customer from the Web site he was initially seeking . .,"'66 After the
diversion, the website may also purport to be the trademark owner and
offer its goods under that guise. In such a case, there is likely to be a cause
of action for traditional trademark infringement at the point of sale.
However, even if the consumer confusion subsides upon reaching the
website, the harm has already been done to the trademark owner and the
electronic marketplace. 67 The infringing website is unjustly free riding on
the trademark owner's popularity. 68 It is the traditional normative goal of
trademark law to prevent such deception. As discussed supra, 169 the
deception also causes considerable harm to consumers, trademark owners,
and the marketplace in general. 7 Even where the consumer quickly
realizes and fixes his mistake, 7 ' the deception may cause the consumer to
lose confidence in the trademark and the triggered display program. 72
' This
is counter to the economic goals of trademark law.
On the other hand, protecting against deception protects consumers
from being manipulated and it helps consumers make better informed
choices.' 73 Thus, the IC doctrine is not only a logical extension of
traditional trademark principles, it also promotes trademarks economic

163. Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass.
1998).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *4
(E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
167. See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[A]
defendant's website disclaimer, proclaiming its real source and disavowing any connection with
its competitor, cannot prevent the damage of initial interest confusion, which will already have been
done by the misdirection of consumers looking for the plaintiff's websites.") (quoting Buckman,
183 A.L.R. Fed. 533).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. Id.
171. See generally Goldman, supra note 35, at 520 ("The searcher need only hit the back
button, type a new web address into the address bar, or select a new bookmark. Any of these steps
requires just a moment or two of the searcher'stime.").
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. GRUNDMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 139.
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goals. However, it can only do this if it is grounded in a proper LOCC
analysis. As discussed supra,1 4 the multi-factor tests available are
unhelpful in making an accurate determination of likelihood of confusion.
As such, Part V proposes a new multi-factor test to guide the analysis.
V. PROPOSED MULTI-FACTOR TEST TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER CONFUSION IN TRADEMARKTRIGGERED DISPLAY CASES

In an ideal world, a court would be able to measure consumer confusion
by interviewing all possible consumers and determining what percentage
are likely to be confused.'75 However, because of a lack of time and
resources, judges must rely on multi-factor tests to estimate the results of
that ideal survey.'7 6
Unfortunately, the tests are often bogged down by factors that do not
address confusion and are tailored to rare fact patterns.' This confuses
rather than aids judges and leads them to rely on a few factors to make a
heuristic determination. 7 ' Instead, the factors should be specifically
tailored to address the question of consumer confusion in the
marketplace.'79 The end result should be able to provide accuracy and
clarity for both judges and litigators.
In fashioning the factors to best measure consumer confusion, an
empirical study of the application of multi-factor tests by courts illustrates
that a functional test should be limited to a small non-exhaustive list of
' The study found that no matter how many factors are listed,
core factors. 80
judges will rely on a limited number in reaching a decision.'81 As such, the
proposed test is limited to the four factors I feel are best suited to test
consumer confusion.
To better understand why the four factors were chosen, it may be
helpful to discuss what factors are left out of the analysis. The second and

174. See Part III.B.2.
175. Beebe, supra note 106, at 1645.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 1601.
178. Id. at 1602.
179. See Jacoby & Sableman, supra note 94, at 709 ("(C]ourts must be wary of acting on their
own judgment about whether a keyword use is misleading or proper, because only actual consumer
understandings matter under trademark law.")
180. Beebe, supra note 106, at 1646.
181. Id. at 1601-02.
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third factors of the Ninth Circuit's "Internet trinity"'82 are left out for the
reasons discussed in Part Ll.B.2. Similarly, there is no factor measuring
intent because "intent is largely irrelevant in determining if consumers
likely will be confused as to source."' 3 An analysis of intent can cause the
court to ignore confusion entirely.' There is also no consideration for the
degree of consumer care as there is no reason to assume that the "ordinary
prudent person ' online exercises a different degree of care depending on
the product.' 86 Nevertheless, as this is a non-exhaustive list of factors,
judges may take these and other factors into consideration depending on
the circumstances of the case.
It is also worth noting how the test should interact with secondary
liability. The operators of the underlying technology, for example, search
engines, should not be liable for direct infringement. Their use and sale of
trademarks as triggers benefits consumers and the marketplace.'87 They
can, however, be liable for contributory infringement if they induce others
to confuse consumers with the display. This test will help to determine
whether there is consumer confusion in the first place. If the court finds
that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion, then the court can apply
the traditional contributory liability test to determine liability. 8
With this in mind, the proper test to determine the LOCC with regard
to triggered displays should be as follows: to determine whether the use of
a mark on a trademark-triggered advertisement is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive, the court may consider all relevant

182. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
183. Lois Sportswear, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986).
184. See SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562-63 (E.D. Penn. 1999) (making a final
ruling on infringement without any analysis of consumer confusion).
185. See, e.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978, 987 (8th Cir. 1938)
("The test of whether a trademark is infringed has been several times stated by this Court to be
whether 'an ordinarily prudent purchaser be liable to purchase the other."') (citing Reid, Murdoch
& Co. v. H. P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1931)).
186. See generally Goldman, supra note 35, at 515-23 (discussing consumer behaviors and
expectations in the search result process).
187. See supra Part II.B.1.
188. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit.
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factors, including the following: (i) the degree of similarity of the marks
used in the display as perceived by the relevant consumer population; (ii)
the degree to which the aesthetic presentation of the display is likely to
cause confusion, mistake, or deception; (iii) the degree to which claims
made on the display are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception;
and (iv) the degree to which real evidence indicates actual confusion,
mistake or deception. The following subsections provide an in-depth
analysis of each factor.
A. FirstFactor:Similarity
A measurement of the similarity of the marks is a necessary threshold
inquiry into whether trademark infringement has occurred.'8 9 Generally,
similarity of the marks is tested on sight, sound, and meaning in the
relevant marketplace. 9 ' Courts should "make their comparison [']in light
of what happens in the marketplace,['] not merely by looking at the two
marks side-by-side."' 9 ' As consumers do not interact with the trigger
function, this factor should only measure the similarity of the marks used
in the display.' 92
History illustrates that "the plaintiff must win the similarity factor in
order to have any chance of winning the multifactor test."' 93 Because this
factor can be especially damaging for plaintiffs, similarities should weigh
more heavily than differences.' 94 As such, there should be a simple
determination in cases where the marks are completely or practically
identical. In cases where the defendant uses the mark followed by a top
level domain, the courts should find that the marks are sufficiently similar
for the purposes of this factor.' 95 Similarly, courts should focus on
substance and ignore differences in capitalization, font, or tense. 9 6 For

189. See, e.g., Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("The two marks must bear some threshold resemblance in order to trigger inquiry into
extrinsic factors.").
190. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir. 1979).
191. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976)).
192. See supra text accompanying note 149.
193. Beebe, supra note 106, at 1623.
194. SeeAMF, 599 F.2d at 351.
195. See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 04-4371,2006 WL 737064, at *5 (D.
Minn. 2006); but see 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WHENU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408-09 (2d Cir.
2005) ("We conclude that, to the contrary, the differences between the marks are actually quite
significant because they transform [the trademark] ... into a word combination that functions more
or less like a public key .... ").
196. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Co., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004).
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example, in the on going litigation between American Airlines and Google,
there is a dispute over whether "American Airline" is sufficiently similar
to the "American Airlines" trademark.'97 As this factor is merely a
threshold question, "American Airline" is sufficiently similar.' Google's
contention that the mark is being used descriptively is a question for a
different factor.
However, if and when the similarities are not clear, the court should
rely on consumer surveys to determine "what occurs in the marketplace,
not in the courtroom."' 99 Judges should also avoid comparing the marks
side by side and using a personal heuristic determination. They must
account for marks that can "confuse consumers who do not have both
marks before them but who may have general, vague, or even hazy,
impression or recollection of the other party's mark."20 This is especially
relevant in pop-up ads, where consumers only interact with the defendant's
use of the mark. Nevertheless, it will be important for judges to remember
that a finding of insufficient similarity is particularly damaging to a
plaintiff's cases.' °
Hence, courts should weigh this factor carefully and give more weight
to similarities than to differences.20 2 If after doing so a court finds that
there is insufficient similarity, then there is a strong presumption that the
plaintiff cannot prevail. But, when this factor does weigh in favor of the
plaintiff, it should not give a presumption of infringement. Instead, the
judge should go on to evaluate the remaining factors.
B. Second Factor:Aesthetic Presentationof the Display
Next, the judge is to determine the likelihood that consumers would be
confused by the aesthetic presentation of the display. Analysis of this
factor should focus on the placement, design, and possible emphasis placed
on the trademark.20 3 Similarly, courts should also take into account any
aspects of the display that feature the name of the defendant's company or

197. Defendant Google's Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 8 n.8, Am.
Airlines, Inc., v. Google, Inc., No. 4-07-CV-487 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2007).
198. Id.
199. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976).
200. Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275,
283 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
202. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir. 1979).
203. Seegenerally Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 04-4371,2006 WL 737064,
at *5-7 (D. Minn. 2006) ("Defendant's advertisement ... places the Edina Realty mark in the
headline, which is underlined and in bold font.").

20081
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website. 2' Likewise, consumer surveys should focus on consumer
perceptions of these design factors and whether they are likely to cause
confusion.
When the display contains the trademark and the defendant's name, it
will be especially important for the parties to provide the judge with
consumer surveys to illustrate how the relevant market perceives the
relevant placements. 20' For example, in Storus Co. v. Aroa Mktg., the
disputed search result featured the defendant's own trademark and web
address, but the plaintiff's mark also appeared as the title in color, bold and
underlined.2 °6 In such a case, surveys are needed to illustrate how the
relative placements are perceived by the relevant consumer population.2 7
Designing an appropriate survey should be relatively easy, as the survey
can test subjects with a screen shot identical to that experienced in the
marketplace. 28 The survey can then test a control group by providing a
screenshot that is identical except for the infringing mark.20 9 With the
survey evidence available, the court can then "rely on its own experience
and understanding of human nature in drawing reasonable inferences about
the reactions of consumers to the challenged advertising. 210
However, consumer surveys may not be necessary when the undisputed
evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff. When the mark does
not appear at all on the display, the court should dismiss the plaintiffs
claims. On the other hand, when the defendant displays the trademark
without providing its own name, then the court can create a presumption
of consumer confusion. For example, in American Airline's complaint
against Google there is a screenshot of a search result with "Free AA
Travel Offers" as the title, and "AA.com-Promotion.info" as the web

204. See generally id. ("The name of defendant's company is listed in much smaller font at
the bottom of the ad.").
205. See McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
206. Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454, 2008 WL 449835, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Feb.
15, 2008).
207. See McNeilab, Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 525.
208. See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at
*5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
209. Id. ("As the survey expert admitted, an effective control should have removed from the
page viewed by the test group the allegedly infringing elements for which GEICO wanted to
measure confusion, such as the Sponsored Links mentioning GEICO, while keeping the other
elements as constant as possible.").
210. McNeilab, Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 525.
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address.2 1 ' Such a display gives every indication that it is the actual
trademark owner's website without any mitigating factors.
Giving a presumption of infringement in this case is consistent with the
normative goals of preventing confusion and promoting economic
efficiency. A website owner should not be able to use another's website in
a manner that makes itself out to be the trademark owner. Similarly,
economic efficiency dictates that website owners should accurately
describe their products in triggered displays. By including the trademark
in the title and the web address, the display goes against both principles.
As such, weighing this factor in favor of plaintiff is consistent with those
principles.
C. Third Factor:Statements Containedin the Display
Having determined the likelihood that consumers are confused by the
presentation of the display, this factor then determines whether that
confusion is enhanced or alleviated by any claims made by the defendant.
For instance, in the American Airlines example above, the presumption of
infringement can be weighed against any claims that may alleviate the
confusion. As such, the courts can analyze all claims regardless of the use
of a trademark. But when the trademark is used, this factor can help
determine whether the use is descriptive, comparative, or confusing.
To that end, courts can rely on the same tools that they utilize to test the
tendency or capacity for claims to deceive in false advertising cases.
Certain false advertising precedents will be particularly helpful in
analyzing this factor. For example, false advertising law has long dealt
with cases where the claims are literally true, but still have a tendency to
mislead or deceive.212 This precedent will help in analyzing cases where
claims are literally descriptive or comparative but may be confusing by
implication. Following false advertising precedent, courts should look to
survey evidence to determine whether the claims actually communicate a
confusing message.213

211. Complaint of Am. Airlines, Inc. at 21, Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Google, Inc., No. 4-07-CV487 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007).
212. See, e.g., Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978)
("That Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more than literal falsehoods cannot be
questioned.... Were it otherwise, clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous
suggestions could shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protection against such
sophisticated deception is most needed.").
213. Bruce P. Keller, "It Keeps Going and Going and Going": The Expansion of False
Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham Act, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 141 (1996)
("When an advertisement is implicitly false, however, courts will judge its tendency or capacity to
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To illustrate, Google argues that the title "Free AA Travel Offers" is
merely indicating "that the web site provides information about promotions
on American Airlines."' As the website does provide such information by
linking to "a series of articles," this claim is indeed descriptive of offerings
of the website.215 However, the question for a court should be, "what does
the person to whom the advertisement is addressed find to be the
message?"2 6 It may be the case that it indicates to consumers that they are
at the American Airlines website. The plaintiff must again provide survey
evidence that consumers perceive the claims as source indicative and not
merely descriptive. The judge can weigh this evidence, and in combination
with the second factor, have an estimate of the level of consumer confusion
caused by the triggered display.
D. FourthFactor:Real Evidence ofActual Confusion
This factor then weighs that estimate against real evidence of consumer
confusion "occurring in the market place under normally occurring
' When it is available "[t]here can be no more positive or
conditions."217
substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion."218 Nevertheless, courts
view such evidence as unnecessary as it is normally very hard to come by
in traditional trademark infringement cases.2" 9 But, in triggered display

deceive not on its own determination of falsity, but by reference to evidence indicating that the
public will be misled. Often this takes the form of consumer survey evidence.").
214. Defendant Google's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Brief in Support Thereof at 13,
Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Google, Inc., No. 4-07-CV-487 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007).
215. Id.
216. Am. Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
217. See Sandra Edelman, Failureto Conduct a Survey in TrademarkInfringement Cases:A
Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 747 n.7 (2000).
Many courts use the term "actual confusion" to refer to both confusion occurring
among consumers in the market place under normally occurring conditions, as
well as survey evidence of confusion occurring in an artificially created market
research context. This article will use the term "real" actual confusion to refer to
the former, as opposed to the latter type of evidence.
Id.
218. World Carpets, Inc. v. Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971).
219. See Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755,761 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Actual
confusion or deception of purchasers is not essential to a finding of trademark infringement or
unfair competition, it being recognized that reliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is
practically almost impossible to secure.").
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cases, the Internet provides numerous resources to make real evidence
available.
The strongest form of real evidence is when there is a record of the
"confused" parties taking some affirmative action.220 In the context of
triggered displays, there should always be a record of actual consumer
decisions in response to the questioned display.22 ' For example, in Storus
Corp., the parties provided the court with information regarding how many
times the ad appeared to consumers, and how many times they clicked on
the link.222 This provided the court with a "click-through rate" 223 that
measures the effectiveness of the program. 224 There should also be other
relevant information available because triggered displays are often heavily
monitored to assure effectiveness.225
However, in order to prevail on this factor, both parties should bear the
burden of proving that any diversion of consumers was or was not actually
caused by confusion as to the source of the website. 226 The Storus Corp.
court took the "click-through" rate as evidence of an "initial interest
confusion" on the part of consumers. 227 But, without context, the clickthrough rate does not prove any causation. Consumers may have clicked
on the defendant's link merely because it provided a clear alternative. So
to help the court make a determination, the defendant should provide
evidence of other possible explanations for the click-through rates.
Conversely, the plaintiff should provide evidence to indicate that the only
reasonable cause is consumer confusion.22 ' Additionally, the plaintiff may
supplement the argument by pointing to other real evidence of actual
consumer confusion, such as complaints or correspondence letters.229

220. See Michael J.Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal Trademark
InfringementLitigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 30-31 (1994).
221. For example, companies participating in Google's AdWords program are provided with
extensive information regarding consumer's actions in response to certain search terms. See Google
AdWords, Placement Performance Report, https://adwords.google.com/select/afc/performa
nce.html?sourceid=awo&subid=en-us-et-awhp-tab.
222. Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454, 2008 WL 449835, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
13, 2008).
223. See Brandon Brown, Note, Fortifyingthe Safe Harbors:Reevaluating the DMCA in a
Web 2.0 World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 452 (2008) (defining what "click-through rate"
means).
224. Storus Corp., 2008 WL 449835, at *4.
225. See supra note 221.
226. See Taj Mahal Enter., Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D.N.J. 1990).
227. Storus Corp., 2008 WL 449835, at *5.
228. See generallyNikkal Indus. Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(explaining that plaintiff failed to eliminate other possible causes for the alleged harm.).
229. See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 04-4371,2006 WL 737064, at *5 (D.
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By implementing a stringent requirement of causation in this factor, it
ensures that the court focuses on whether consumers are acting out of
confusion or curiosity in the marketplace. If the plaintiff can adequately
prove this factor then there is positive proof of a likelihood of confusion.230
On the other hand, it allows the defendant to show that it is not a
detrimental use. Even if neither party shows a strong enough inference to
sway the court, it still allows for the parties to provide the court with
information and arguments regarding the effect that the triggered display
is having on the market. It will thus give the court a foundational
knowledge of the marketplace to better analyze the findings in the
preceding factors. With all the evidence at hand, the court can then make
a determination as to whether the challenged conduct is likely to confuse
consumers to the detriment of the marketplace and its participants.
VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, the greatest advantage provided by my comprehensive
solution is that it can prevent deceptive uses while promoting economic
efficiency. First, a confusion analysis can allow courts to dismiss frivolous
claims where the mark is used solely in the trigger function.23 To avoid
dismissal, plaintiffs must bear the burden of adequately pleading that the
defendant presented their mark to consumers.232 Without such a showing,
there is no possibility of confusion because consumers do not interact with
the mark.233 This is the right economic result because the use oftrademarks
as a trigger increases competition and information dissemination.234
Next, the HC doctrine and accompanying multi-factor test provide
protection from deceptive uses without preventing beneficial uses. This is
true for both current and future uses of trademark-triggered displays. As
triggered displays evolve, such as into video displays, the factors will still
be applicable. The second factor will still focus on the aesthetic use of the
trademark, whether the use is visual or audible.235 Similarly, by following
false advertising precedent, the third factor will be able to deal with
explicit and implicit claims made in any media. Also, companies should
continue to maintain records of consumer interactions with the display in
Minn. 2006).
230. Id.
231. See supra Part V.A. 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See supra Part II.B. 1.
235. See supra Part IV.B.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW & POLICY

[Vol. 13

order to ensure that the programs remain effective. This makes sure that
there will always be real evidence to analyze in triggered display cases.
As a whole, this will provide much needed clarity for trademark law
and the electronic marketplace. Website operators will be able to
confidently use trademarks as triggers to better reach consumers. It will
also allow for the use of trademarks to make descriptive and comparative
uses so long as they are not used to deceive. This will allow the operators
of triggered displays to abandon harsh policies against the use of
trademarks.2 36 Finally, by providing clarity as to how deception will be
measured, companies will be forced to accurately advertise their services
in the display. Because of the unregulated nature of the Internet, consumers
have come to expect a certain level of deception. This limits the confidence
that consumers have in ecommerce. By preventing deception and
encouraging truthful advertising, consumer confidence will increase and
so will the effectiveness of the marketplace.
As such, courts should adopt my recommendation to refocus the
infringement analysis in consumer confusion. By dismissing frivolous
claims and applying the new multi-factor test for LOCC, trademark law
will further its normative goals by preventing deception and promoting
economic efficiency.

236. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.

